Professional Responsibility Problems
and Contempt in Advocacy

HON. HORACE W. GILMORE*

Attorneys have a right to be persistent, vociferous, contentious,
and imposing, even to the point of appearing obnoxious when actting in their client's behalf. An attorney may with impunity take
full advantage of the range of conduct that our adversary system
allows. Given this extreme liberality necessary to a vital balance
and thus the effective discovery of truth through the adversary
process, an attorney possesses the requisite intent only if he knows
or reasonably should be aware in view of all the circumstances,
especially the heat of controversy that he is exceeding the outermost limits of his proper role in hindering rather than facilitating
the search for truth.
1
Thus spoke the Seventh Circuit in In re Dellinger on appeal from
contempt convictions in the Chicago Seven trial. In the companion
case of United States v. Seale,2 the Court pointed out that mere
disrespect or the affront to a judge's sense of dignity will not sus3
tain a citation for contempt. It further held that under 18 U.S.C.
§ 401 (1) four elements are required in order to support a contempt
citation: the conduct at issue must constitute misbehavior; the
misbehavior must rise to the level of obstruction of the administration of justice; the conduct must be in the court's presence or so
*
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Circuit Judge, Third Judicial Circuit of Michigan.
461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972).
461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 366-67.
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proximate that it obstructs the administration of justice; and finally
there must be some intent to obstruct.
The Chicago Seven cases appear to be landmark cases in the area
of contempt in advocacy. The Seventh Circuit has set as stringent
requirements for findings of contempt, because of vigorous advocacy, as are to be found in any decided cases.
In this article I propose to deal with a comparison between the
standards of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility and
general contempt standards in two contexts: advocacy in the court
room and the limits of pre-trial publicity by advocates. Although
there have been many interesting developments in the law of contempt where judges have waited until the end of the trial to deal
with what is basically summary contempt, 4 an analysis of these
problems is beyond the scope of this article.
To attempt a clear definition of contempt in advocacy is exceedingly difficult. To attempt to define what kind of advocacy constitutes professional misconduct is even harder.
I.

ADVOCACY iN THE COURT

As pointed out above, Dellinger and Seale are high-water marks
in condoning vigorous advocacy and protecting advocates from contempt citations, but the United States Supreme -Court likewise has
spoken strongly on the subject. In In re McConnell,5 McConnell,
who was counsel for the plaintiff in an anti-trust suit, insisted on
his right to ask questions after the judge had stopped him from a
certain line of questioning. McConnell stated he proposed to continue the questions unless some bailiff stopped him. The district
judge found him guilty of criminal contempt and imposed a jail
sentence. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, relying upon 18 U.S.C. § 401, providing that the contempt power may
be imposed summarily for misbehavior of any person in the Court's
presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of
justice. Quoting Ex parte Hudgings,6 the Court said:
"An obstruction to the performance of judicial duty resulting from
an act done in the presence of the court is, then, the characteristic
upon which the power to punish for contempt must rest .... "7
4. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971); Codispoti v. Pennsyl-

vania, 94 S. Ct. 2687 (1974); Taylor v. Hayes, 94 S. Ct. 2697 (1974).
5. 370 U.S. 230 (1962).
6. 249 U.S. 378 (1919).
7. In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 234 (1962).

The Court went on to say that the question in the instant case
came down to whether it can "'clearly be shown'.
that the petitioner's statements, while attempting to make his offer of proof,
actually obstructed the district judge in the 'performance of judicial
duty'."8
The Court stated:
While we appreciate the necessity for a judge to have the power
to protect himself from actual obstruction in the courtroom ...
it is also essential to a fair administration of justice that lawyers
be able to make honest, good-faith efforts to present their clients'
cases ....

To preserve the kind of trials that our system envisages,

Congress has limited the summary contempt power vested in courts
to the least possible power adequate to prevent actual obstruction
of justice .... 9

And in Offutt v. United States,10 the Court emphasized the importance of assuring self-restraint by district judges in the employment
of the summary contempt power.
In Holt v. Virginia,"' contempt proceedings were instituted by
the trial judge against a lawyer who had represented some defendants in a libel suit. The attorney filed a motion asking the trial
judge to disqualify himself from trying the contempt case, and,
after denial of the motion, filed a motion for change of venue, alleging in both motions bias on the part of the judge. Another attorney
representing the first attorney in the contempt proceedings read
this motion to the judge as part of his argument urging a change
of venue. Both attorneys were adjudicated guilty of contempt and
each was fined $50. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding that the language used in the motion authorized
the invocation of the summnary contempt power.

The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, and stated:
[T]he words used in the motions were plain English, in no way
offensive in themselves, and wholly appropriate to charge bias in
the community and bias of the presiding judge ....

[I]f the

charges were "insulting" it was inherent in the issue of bias raised,
an issue which we have seen had to be raised, according to the
charges, to escape the probability of a constitutionally unfair trial.
... The issue of truth or falsity of these charges was not heard,
the trial court choosing instead to convict and sentence petitioner

for having done nothing more than make the charges. Even if
failure to prove their allegations of bias could under any circumstances ever be made part of the basis of a contempt charge against
petitioner, these convictions cannot rest on any such unproven
assumption. 12
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id.
370 U.S. at 236.
348 U.S. 11 (1954).
381 U.S. 131 (1965).
Id. at 137.
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In In re Little,' 3 the petitioner appeared in pro per on a charge of
carrying a concealed weapon. Prior to trial, he moved for a continuance because his lawyer had a trial in a different city, but the
trial judge denied the motion and proceeded with trial. In his
summation following the closing of the evidence, petitioner stated
the court was biased, had pre-judged the case, and that he (the
petitioner) was a political prisoner. He was held guilty of contempt
and the appellate courts of North Carolina denied review. The
Supreme Court of the United States reversed, stating:
We hold that in the context of this case petitioner's statements
in summation did not constitute criminal contempt ....
He was
...clearly entitled to as much latitude in conducting his defense as
we have held is enjoyed by counsel vigorously expousing a client's
cause....
There is no indication . .. that petitioner's statements
were uttered in a boisterous tone or in any wise actually disrupted
the court proceeding.14

Although some of the language of other cases, such as Mayberry
v. Pennsylvania,'5 Taylor v. Hayes,16 and Codispoti v. Pennsylvania'7 would indicate that similar types of actions could have been
dealt with summarily by the trial court, those case convictions were
reversed because the trial judge waited until the end of the case
to impose summary contempt penalties. It should also be noted that
the Seale court, relying on Morissette v. United States, 8 held that
there was a strict requirement of intent in every case. Further,
relying upon In re Brown,"9 it found that there must be proof be-

yond a reasonable doubt that the alleged contemnor possessed the
required intent to forerun a criminal contempt conviction.
Nothing in Supreme Court cases seems to cast serious doubt upon
the conclusions in Dellingerand Seale. The four standards of Seale

appear to have solid support when the Supreme Court's cases on
contempt and advocacy are analyzed. Not only must the conduct
constitute misbehavior, it must rise to the level of obstruction of
the administration of justice. It also must be in the Court's presence or so proximate that it obstructs the administration of justice
13. 404 U.S. 553 (1972).
14. Id. at 555.
15. 400 U.S. 455 (1971).

16. 94 S. Ct. 2697 (1974).

17. 94 S. Ct. 2687 (1974).
18. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
19. 454 F.2d 999 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

and there must be an intent to obstruct. Additionally, proof beyond
a reasonable doubt is required.
It is true that most of the cases cited have relied upon the
language of 18 U.S.C. § 401, which limits the summary contempt
power to misbehavior that obstructs the administration of justice,
but it is clear that sixth amendment problems are involved. The
sixth amendment protects a lawyer in providing adequate, proper
and vigorous representation of his clients, and in each instance in
which the Court has reversed contempt citations, it has been concerned with the protection of these sixth amendment rights.
With the broad freedom now apparently given in advocacy in
trial, one must consider the effect of the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility in the advocacy areas. Several Ethical Considerations
(EC) and Disciplinary Rules (DR) address this point. EC 7-36
provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Although a lawyer has the duty to represent his client
zealously, he should not engage in any conduct that offends the
dignity and decorum of the proceedings. While maintaining his
independence, a lawyer should be respectful, courteous, and aboveboard in his
relations with a judge or hearing officer before whom
20
he appears.

EC 7-37 provides in part:
Haranguing and offensive tactics by lawyers interfere with
the orderly administration
of justice and have no proper place in
21
our legal system.
Further, DR 7-106(C), which sets a minimum standard below
which a lawyer may not go without subjecting himself to professional discipline, provides:
(C) In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal,
a lawyer shall not:
(1) State or allude to any matter that he has no reasonable
basis to believe is relevant to the case or that will not
be supported by admissible evidence.
(2) Ask any question that he has no reasonable basis to
believe is relevant to the case and that is intended to
degrade a witness or other person.
(5) Fail to comply with known local customs of courtesy
or practice of the bar or a particular tribunal without
-giving

to opposing -counsel timely notice of his intent

not to comply.
20. ABA
36.
21. ABA

37.

CODE OF PROFFSSIONAL REsPONsIBILiTY,

Ethical Consideration 7-

CODE OF PRorEssioNAL REsPONSIBmITy,

Ethical Consideration 7-
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(6) Engage in undignified or discourteous conduct which
is degrading to a tribunal.
(7) Intentionally or habitually violate
any established rule
22
of procedure or of evidence.

If an intent to obstruct justice or obstruction of justice is necessary before a lawyer can be found guilty of contempt in the trial
of a lawsuit, the question necessarily arises as to whether, against
a claim of sixth amendment advocacy, a lawyer can be disciplined
for violation of DR 7-106, when there is no showing that his conduct
constitutes an obstruction of justice and when there is no showing
of any intent to obstruct justice.
2 must be considered.
In this connection Spevack v. Klein~
There,
an attorney successfully asserted the fifth amendment in bar
disciplinary proceedings. The attorney refused to answer any questions or produce any records relating to his handling of certain fiduciary matters. Solely upon his refusal to answer and upon his
assertion of the fifth amendment, New York disbarred the attorney. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed, overruling Cohen v. Hurley24 and holding that a lawyer had an absolute
right to assert his fifth amendment privilege in bar disciplinary
proceedings without suffering any penalty therefor.
The Court stated:
And so the question emerges whether the principle of Malloy v.
Hogan is inapplicable because petitioner is a member of the Bar.
We conclude that Cohen v. Hurley should be overruled, that the

Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been absorbed in the Fourteenth, that it extends its protection to lawyers
as well as to other individuals, and that it should not be watered
down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and deprivation of
a livelihood as a price for asserting it.25
Conceding that the fifth amendment privilege of self-incrimination is applicable to protect lawyers from bar discipline, it does not
follow that the Code of Professional Responsibility can be flouted
with impunity on a sixth amendment claim of vigorous advocacy.
Spevack was, after all, a very narrow holding, and at no place did
it assert that all of the protections of a criminal case are present
22.
(C).
23.
24.
25.

ABA CODE

OF PROFESsIoNAL REsPONsIBILITY,

385 U.S. 511 (1967).
366 U.S. 117 (1961).
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514 (1967).

Disciplinary Rule 7-106

in bar discipline proceedings. No one has suggested, for example,
that a lawyer in disciplinary proceedings has a right to a jury trial.
Courts simply cannot operate unless they are a forum for careful
analysis and presentation of disputed issues of fact and law. Even
though a lawyer cannot be punished for contempt, absent a showing
of obstruction and intent to obstruct, it does not follow that bar
discipline cannot be imposed absent obstruction or intent to obstruct. DR 7-106 allows vigorous advocacy in the trial of a law
suit. DR 7-10126 requires zealous representation of the client. It
is submitted that a lawyer can zealously represent his client and
still comply with the Disciplinary Rules.
To equate criminal contempt with bar discipline would inevitably
lower standards of advocacy required of lawyers. We can expect
no less and the standards of contempt should not be carried over
to bar discipline. Vigorous advocacy can exist under the mandates
of the Disciplinary Rules, and there is no good reason why criminal
contempt standards should lower the minimum professional standards required of advocates. As the Supreme Court pointed out in
Taylor v. Hayes:
Nothing we have said here should be construed to condone the
type of conduct described ....

Behavior of this nature has no place

in the court room, which, in a free society,
is a forum for courteous
and reasoned pursuit of truth and justice. 2 7
The bar should expect no lower standard from its members.

The organized bar has also spoken on this subject in Standard
7-1 of the ABA StandardsRelating to the ProsecutionFunctionand
Defense Function. That Standard provides:
7-1. Courtroom Decorum:
(a) As an officer of the court, the lawyer should support the
authority of the Court and the dignity of the trial court
room, by strict adherence to the rules of decorum and by
manifesting an attitude of professional respect towards

the judge, opposing counsel, witnesses and jurors.
(c)

It is unprofessional conduct for a lawyer to engage in
behavior or tactics purposedly calculated to irritate or

annoy the court or the prosecutor.

(e) Lawyers should cooperate with courts and the organized bar in developing codes of2 decorum and professional
etiquette for each jurisdiction. 8

26. ABA CODE OF

PROFESsIoNAL RESPONSIBILITY,

27. 94 S. Ct. 2697, 2706 (1974).
28. ABA STANDARDs RELATING
DEFENSE FUNCTION (1971).

Disciplinary Rule 7-101.

TO TE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE
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The Commentary to 7-1 makes this interesting observation:
A reasonable balance must be reached on matters of conduct
so that judicial proceedings are not permitted to degenerate to the
level of street brawls, but it is important that no artificial standards
of court room conduct impede the advocates from performing their
legitimate function so as to preclude vigorous advocacy of their
viewpoints on legal questions, and the zealous advancement of their
side of the case....
...
An important aspect of the image of justice is the relations
which are seen to exist in the court room between the several
lawyer-participants: defense counsel, the prosecutor and the judge.
Of necessity, the lawyer must often be forceful and vigorous in
his questioning of the witness and his argument to the jury. This
does not mean, however, that he may make a farce of the trial
or undermine the dignity of the legal process by excessive
histrionics....
These standards seek to suggest certain limited forms of court
room misconduct as unprofessional conduct, appropriate for the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions. To avoid undue limitations
on appropriate advocacy, the extreme sanctions are limited to conduct properly calculated to annoy or irritate. Repetition of misconduct after a warning from the bench should be sufficient
to
29
establish a prima facie showing of purposeful misconduct.
Everyone agrees that the court room must be a place for the
reasoned presentation of evidence and the reasoned disposition of
litigation. All agree that lawyers have a duty to be respectful,
while vigorous, as advocates. There is no reason for applying criminal contempt standards to bar disciplinary proceedings, so long as
the right to vigorous advocacy remains.

II. PRE-TRiAL PuBucrryiBY ADVOCATES
A related problem arises under DR 7-10730 covering pre-trial and
trial publicity. This Disciplinary Rule severely restricts the freedom of a lawyer to make any statement except innocuous ones relating to both criminal and civil cases, both before and during trial.
DR 7-107 is drawn from the ABA Standards for Fair Trial and
Free Press.3 ' Again, the question arises whether a lawyer can be
disciplined under this rule, where a contempt citation would be for29. Id. at Commentary to paragraph 7-1 (c).
30. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 7-102.
31. ABA STrmus RmEAT G To FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (1968).

bidden unless it was shown that the actions of the lawyer constituted a clear and present danger to the administration of justice.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in a series of major cases, 2
has held that where extra-judicial utterances do not constitute a
clear and present danger to the administration of justice, such utterances may not be a basis for contempt action because of first amendment rights of freedom of expression.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of the United States and
various state courts have been very much concerned about pre-trial
publicity. In State v. Van Duyne,33 the New Jersey Supreme Court,
in interpreting Canon) 20 of the former Canons of Professional
Ethics, held that the trial court might well proscribe extra-judicial
statements by any lawyer,34party, witness or court official which
divulge prejudicial matters.

In Shepherd v. Maxwell,35 the United States Supreme Court
endorsed reasonable restrictions on prejudicial extra-judicial publicity. The Court also spoke on the subject in Estes v. Texas:8 0
[T]he atmosphere essential to preservation of a fair trial-the
most 37fundamental of all freedoms-must be maintained at all
costS.

The Supreme Court has also come down heavily in favor of a fair
trial as against unfettered right to pre-trial publicity in Patterson
v. Colorado38 and Marshall-v. United States.89
In addition, the question of prior restraint of first amendment
rights must be considered. The Supreme Court of the United States
has uniformly held that there can be no prior restraint of expression, the most significant recent cases being New York Times v.
United States4" and Organizationfor a Better Austin v. Keefe.41
One U.S. district court case has analyzed the effect of DR 7-107
on the first amendment. In Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer,42
a proceeding was brought by an association of local lawyers for a
32. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328
U.S. 331 (1946); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Wood v. Georgia,
370 U.S.375 (1962).
33. 43 N.J. 368, 204 A.2d 841 (1964).
34. Id. at 389, 204 A.2d at 852.
35. 384 U.S.333 (1966).
36. 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
37. Id.
38. 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
39. 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
40. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
41. 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
42. 371 F. Supp. 689 (N.D. I1. 1974).
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declaratory judgment and injunction against enforcement of a local
criminal rule of the district court and DR 7-107. The claim was that
the Disciplinary Rule and the local court rule of the U.S. district
court were unconstitutional as violative of first amendment rights.
The district court, in an opinion signed by five judges of the
court constituting its Executive Committee, rejected the first
amendment argument and upheld the validity of DR 7-107 and the
local criminal rule. Relying upon Shepherd v. Maxwell,4 3 the court
held that the adoption of the one-sided approach urged by plaintiff
would ignore the correlative interest of society to a fair trial. It
rejected the "prior restraint argument," saying:
However, unlike the cited cases, the instant situation does not
impose a blanket prohibition on all speech irrespective of conduct.
Rather, the challenged rules seek only to punish speech from which
prejudice is reasonably likely to result. They impose a responsibility on those who violate them as do the laws on slander, libel,
and obscenity.
The rules are therefore clearly not a prior restraint.44
The court also rejected the clear and present danger test of
Bridges,Pennekamp, Craigand Wood:
Bridges and its progeny are more accurately cited for the proposition that, where no "judicial proceeding [is] pending," the First
Amendment rights of the press and private citizens cannot be
proscribed by court order without a serious and imminent threat
to the administration of justice....

This court, however, cannot

by prior legislative deliberations ....

In the later [sic] situation,

accept the notion that these principles must be extended to lawyers
participating in on-going litigation.
S..* Each of the cases cited by the plaintiffs was concerned with
defining the permissible scope of the contempt power, "a common
law concept of the most general and undefined nature" ....
None
dealt with the violation of a narrowly drawn statute or court rule
which seeks to accommodate competing constitutional interests.
The Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that review
of contempt convictions will differ drastically from review of statutory violations, where the need for regulation has been buttressed
great deference is accorded to the judgment of the legislature....
In view of the extensive deliberations which preceded the promulgation of the challenged rules ...

it is evident that they must be

judged by standards analogous to those applied to legislative action....
43. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
44. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 371 F. Supp. 689, 693 (N.D.
1ll. 1974).

Perhaps the most effective distinction may be drawn from the
language of Wood itself. There ... the Court was dealing with
hostile remarks directed at judges or the general administration
of justice. This must be distinguished from the 4situation
where
5
the communication might prejudice a pending trial.

The court concluded that the clear and present danger test was
not applicable in measuring the constitutionality of court rules proscribing the dissemination of prejudicial publicity by trial counsel.
This is the most complete analysis the writer has found covering
the specific question before us. The court clearly rejected the clear
and present danger test, and held that the balance between free
press and fair trial justified what otherwise might be illegitimate
restraints upon free speech.
It is clear that a balance must be struck. Pre-trial and trial
publicity must not endanger a defendant's right to fair trial. And
at the same time, first amendment rights must be protected. In
light of the Chicago Council of Lawyers, Shepherd, and Estes cases,
it appears clear that the limited restraints contained in DR 7-107
will withstand constitutional test. And they should. It is true we
must have freedom of expression for all persons, but when freedom
of speech prejudices a fair trial in a specific case, the restraints of
DR 7-107 and the ABA Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free
Press seem" to be justified. The reasoning of the Chicago Council
of Lawyers case is persuasive and, supported as it is by earlier
statements of the United States Supreme Court, it seems that bar
discipline can and should properly follow a deliberate violation of
DR 7-107. It is not difficult to find an obstruction of justice in
unfettered pre-trial publicity. Such publicity can be offered only
for the purpose of interfering with a fair trial, and these guidelines
clearly maintain a proper balance between free press and fair trial.

III. CONCLUSION
In advocacy, a lawyer has a duty to be a vigorous advocate and
that right is protected by DR 7-101 and 7-106. It is also protected
by the ABA Standardson the ProsecutionFunction and the Defense
Function. Although these standards are higher than those required
for a finding of criminal contempt, lawyers should be held to such
standards in advocacy, and there appears no valid reason that an obstruction of justice or intent to obstruct need be shown before bar
discipline can follow. A lawyer can operate properly and as a vigorous advocate within the limits of the Disciplinary Rules. The Standards should not be equated with those of criminal contempt. Spe45. Id. at 693-94.
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vack v. Klein does not require otherwise. 46
DR 7-107 relating to pre-trial and trial publicity has struck a
proper balance between the right of free expression and the right
to fair trial. No serious first amendment problems can be raised
by the invocation of these rules. Lawyers should be required to
adhere to them and for their violation should suffer disciplinary
action.

46. 385U.S. 511 (1967).

